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incrimination." 123 Therefore, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Harlan
in dissent, "since § 903 is inoperative if even incriminating answers
are given, it is apparent that it is the exercise of the privilege itself
which is the basis for the discharge, quite apart from any inference
of guilt." 124 Thus, though it may well be that to punish by dismissal
the exercise of the privilege by a public employee in response to ques-
tions relating to his official conduct violates due process, the Supreme
Court never reached this question.
Furthermore, it is not clear from the opinion what the status of
Section 903, from a constitutional point of view, is today. Either
the Court meant to hold the charter provision invalid in all cases, or
merely where the privilege is exercised before federal investigative
bodies. Clarification of this question and the more fundamental one
of whether a state may constitutionally use the invocation of the
privilege as a basis for dismissal must await future consideration by
the Court. In the meantime, the Slochower case has created con-
fusion in this area of the law. As pointed out previously, the Court
has upheld restrictions on the exercise by government employees of
rights guaranteed by the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments.12 5
While it is not denied that the exercise of the fifth amendment privi-
lege is a right which cannot be denied any citizen, is the privilege
against self-incrimination more sacred than other analogous constitu-
tional guarantees? 126
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF MOTION PICTURE
CENSORSHIP
The Mutual Cases
Censorship of motion pictures originated as the state's answer
to an urgent need. During its infancy, the movie industry harbored
many shoestring operations concerned with quick profits by means of
'
23 Daniman v. Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 532, 538, 119 N.E2d 373, 377
(1954), appeal denied, 348 U.S. 933 (1955).
124 Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., supra note 122, at 565 (dissenting
opinion). See also Daniman v. Board of Educ., supra note 123; cf. Steinmetz
v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 P.2d 614 (1954), aff'd, 44 Cal. 2d 816, 285 P.2d 617(1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 915 (1956).
125 See text at notes 29-37.
126 "As no constitutional guarantee enjoys preference, so none should suffer
subordination or deletion." Frankfurter, J., Ullmann v. United States, 350
U.S. 422, 428 (1956). ". . . [i1t seems to us that the question [of restricting
the constitutional rights of governmental employees] is practically settled in
the Federal field by [the] United Public Workers . . . [case]. We do not see
that the right not to incriminate oneself stands on any higher ground in a
democracy than the right to take an active part in elections." Faxon v. School
Comm., 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E2d 772, 775 (1954).
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crude and sensational pictures, heedless of the cost to society. Often,
movies were made in one day at a total cost of five hundred dollars.'
Vulgar advertising and the exploitation of the reprehensible personal
activities of actors and actresses were other factors leading to govern-
mental intervention.2  It is small wonder then, that under these con-
ditions stern regulatory measures were taken.
The first motion picture censorship statute was passed in Penn-
sylvania in 1911.3 This was quickly followed by similar legislation
in several other states.4  The first of these statutes to come before
the Supreme Court was the Ohio law in the Mutual Film cases.5 In
these cases, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that motion
pictures were entitled to the protection accorded to speech and the
press on the ground that the exhibition of motion pictures is a
"business pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit." 6
The Ohio censorship statute was stated to be an appropriate method
of such regulation. The statute forbade the issuance of a license for
the exhibition of any films which were not of a "moral, educational
or amusing and harmless character." 7 These terms were considered
sufficiently clear and definite, drawing "precision from the sense and
experience of men." 8 The decision technically did not hold that the
exhibition of movies was not constitutionally protected against im-
pairment by the states, since, at the time, the fourteenth amendment
had not yet been held to extend the free speech guaranties of the first
amendment to the states.9 Nevertheless, the case did have the same
impact.10
I Note, 60 YALE L. REv. 696, 705 n.23 (1951).
2 Note, 30 IND. L.J. 462, 463 n.4 (1955).
3 See Bilgrey and Levenson, Censorship of Motion Pictures-Recent Judi-
cial Decisions and Legislative Action, 1 N.Y.L. FORUM 347, 349 (1955).
4 See, e.g., N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 12?. (Supp. 1955); FLA. STAT. §§ 521.01-.04
(1953); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-101-51-112, 74-2201-74-2209 (Supp.
1953); LA. REv. STAT. §§ 5:301-07. (1950); MD. ANN. CoDs art. 656A, §§ 1-26
(1951); OHIO REv. COE ANN. §§ 3305.01-.99 (Baldwin 1953) ; VA. CODE ANN.§§ 2-98-2-116 (1950). The validity of most of these statutes is at least dubious
today.
5 See Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230; Mutual
Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 247; Mutual Film Corp. v.
Kansas, 236. U.S. 248 (1915). All three cases were decided the same day; the
first decision controlled the second and third.
6 Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915).
7 Id.. at 240.
8Id, at 246. Probably few Supreme Court decisions have received, the
sustained and devastating criticism poured upon the Mutual cases. See, e.g.,
Kupferman and O'Brien, Motion Picture Censorship--The Memphis Blues,
36 CORNELL L.Q. 273 (1951) ;.Notes, 39 CoLUM. L. REv. 138.3, 1391-95 (1939),
60 YALE L.J. 696 (1951); Comment, 49 YALE L.J. 87 (1939).
9 This extension was made shortly thereafter in Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 642 (1925). See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 US. 697 (1931); cf.
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922) ; Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
10 See RD-DR Corp. v. Smith, 183 F.2d 562 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 853 (1950).
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Ten years later, when the extension of the free speech protection
was made," the Supreme Court removed one serious obstacle in the
path of the seemingly inexorable assault on film censorship which has
reached a pinnacle today. Added impetus was given to this movement
in Near v. Minnesota,12 by the strong language of the Court in re-
affirming the revered common law traditions against prior restraints
on freedom of expression.' 3 In that case the Court reversed a state
court decision permanently enjoining the publication of defariatory
or scandalous magazines.14 Of course, the Supreme Court did not
completely close the door to every type of prior restraint based on
content. The Near case did recognize the constitutionality of war-
time censorship, and did not hesitate to add that "on similar grounds,
the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene
publications." 15 A particularly applicable yardstick has been bor-
rowed from the classic "clear and present danger" doctrine originated
in Schenck v. United States.16 There the test formulated was whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature that they so immediately imperil the well being of society and
warrant the state in taking repressive measures. The exceptions
are few, however, and prior restraints continue to be strictly limited.' 8
12 See note 9 supra.
12283 U.S. 697 (1931).
'1 This doctrine can be traced as far back as, Blackstone. "The liberty of
the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in
laying no prezious restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure
for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right
to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this, is to destroy
the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or
illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity." 4 BLAcxSTONE,
CommENTARiEs 151-52 (15th ed. 1809). See also Near v. Minnesota, supra note
9, at 714.
14 See also Lovell v City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (where a municipal
ordinance forbidding the distribution of pamphlets without first securing apermit was held invalid); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936) (where a state statute imposing a license fee based on gross receipts
for the privilege of publishing advertising was held unconstitutional). A
censorship law has been held unconstitutional by a state court as a prior re-
straint when applied to newsreels. See State v. Smith, 48 Ohio Op. 310, 108
N.E2d 582 (Mnic. Ct. 1952). "No controlling distinction can be made be-
tween 'news reels' and 'newspapers.' .. .' Id. at 314, 108 N.E.2d at 587.
15Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). See also Feiner v. New
York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (incitement to riot); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77 (1949) (raucous speeches from sound trucks); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944) (distribution of literature by minors); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (restriction of parades because of traffic
congestion).
16 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
17 As originally formulated, the clear and present danger test applied to
statutes punishing utterances after the fact. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919). By extension, however, it is applicable to any statute designed to
prevent utterances. ". . . [F]reedom of speech, though not absolute . ..is
nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely
is For footnote 18, see page 96.
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The Burstyn Case
The first indication that the foregoing factors presaged a reversal
of the Court's previous exclusion of motion pictures from the free
speech protections was the dictum in United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc.19 There, the Court said, "we have no doubt that mov-
ing pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press
whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment." 20 Four
years later, the doctrine of the Mutual cases was expressly overruled
in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson.21  In this case, the New York
censorship board, acting under the authority of the New York
statute,22 banned the showing of a movie called "The Miracle" on
the ground that it was "sacrilegious." Although the New York Court
of Appeals thought the term definable enough to comply with the
requirements of procedural due process,2 the Supreme Court re-
versed on the ground of vagueness, and, at the same time, emphasized
the narrow area open to prior restraints.24  Thus, the door was
to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises
far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308
(1940) ; Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951). It would seem, how-
ever, that there is no room for the application of the clear and present danger
test in the narrow area open to censorship today. Justice Frankfurter pointed
out that the clear and present danger test does not apply to utterances not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech "certainly no one would
contend that obscene speech, for example, may be punished only upon a showing
of such circumstances. Libel, as we have seen, is in the same'class." Beaidiarais
v. Illiaois, 43" U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
18_ The standard of regulation must be narrowly confined to those re.cognized
exceptional circumstances not falling under the protection of the first amend-
ment. "Thes."ificlude the lewd and obscene, the profane. the libel'.0s; and the
insulting 'r".fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to in'cite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed
'that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such* slight social value as a step to truth that any" benefit that may be de-
rived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
19334 U.S. 131 (1948).
20 United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
21343 U.S. 495 (1952). "For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that ex-
pression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and
free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. To the extent
that language in the opinion in Mutual Fibi Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, supra,
is out of harmony with the views here set forth, we no longer adhere to it."
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
22 N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 122.
23 ".. . [N]o religion, as that word is understood by the ordinary, reason-
able person, shall be treated with contempt, mockery, scorn and ridicule .. "
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 303 N.Y. 242, 258, 101 N.E.2d 665, 672 (1951),
rev'd, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
24 "... [T]he state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all
religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior re-
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opened and the vacuum was soon filled with decisions holding various
censorship statutes unconstitutional.2
5
Though the Supreme Court attempted to make clear its rationale
in the Burstyn case, a week later it decided Gelling v. Texas 26 with
a terse per curiam opinion, citing the Burstyn decision and Winters
v. New York.27 Since indefiniteness is the primary basis of the hold-
ing in the Winters case, it seems clear that the statute in the Gelling
decision which forbade the exhibition of a picture "'prejudicial to
the best interests of the people' "28 was objectionable on that ground.
Following this case, however, have been a number of per curiam
opinions whose basis is not so clear.29 In Superior Films, Inc. v.
Department of Education,3" an Ohio court had upheld the denial of a
license on the ground that the motion picture was "harmful." Counsel
for Ohio argued before the Supreme Court that the term in question
had been limited by the state court to mean "inciting to crime." 31
Again, in Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents,3 2 the New
York censors refused a license on the ground that the foreign film
"La Ronde," was "immoral" and would "tend to corrupt morals." 33
Specifically, they considered it a portrayal and stimulus of sexual
immorality. The Court of Appeals upheld the board's ruling. The
Supreme Court, however, reversed both decisions citing only the
Burstyn case. 34 Although the conclusion is open to dispute, it would
straints upon the expression of those views." Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495, 505 (1952).
25 See, e.g., Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587
(1954) (per curiam) ; Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952) (per curiam);
State v. Smith, 108 N.E.2d 582 (Toledo Munic. Ct. 1952).
26 343 U.S. 960 (1952) (per curiam).
27 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (There, a statute was held unconstitutional which
made it a crime to sell a magazine in which stories of crime and bloodshed
were massed in such a way as to incite crime.).
28 Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952) (per curiam) (concurring
opinions).
29 Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., supra note 25; Commercial
Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 346 U.S. 587 (1954) (per curiam) ; Holmby
Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955) (per curiam).
30 159 Ohio St. 315, 112 N.E.2d 311 (1953), rev'd per curiam, 346 U.S. 587
(1954),
3122 U.S.L. WElc 3182 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1954) (No. 26). The statute in
question read as follows: "Only such films as. are, in the judgment and dis-
cretion of the--[Board of Censors] of a moral, educational, or amusing and
harmless character shall be passed and approved by such . . . [board]." OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 3305.04 (Baldwin 1953).
32 305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E.2d 502 (1953), rev'd per curiam sub norn., Superior.
Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
33 Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, supra note 32. Another
attempt was recently made to test the term "indecent" in the New York statute,
but the court ruled the picture acceptable and would not allow the petitioner
to stipulate that the picture was "indecent." Capitol Enterprises, Inc. v. Board
of Regents, 1 A.D.2d 990, 149 N.Y.S.2d 920 (3d Dep't 1956) (mem. opinion).
34 Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954) (per
curiam).
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seem that the ground for the reversal was the vagueness of the stat-
utes,35 since the Ohio statute was concededly indefinite, 36 and even the
New York Court of Appeals could not agree on a definition of
"immoral." 37
The Holmby Productions Case
The next case in the chain, and the most significant since the
Burstyn decision, was Hoimby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn.38 There,
the Supreme Court of Kansas upheld the censor's disapproval of a
motion picture under the Kansas statute.3 9 The court declared that
" 'obscene, indecent, or immoral, or such as tend to debase or corrupt
morals' " were not so vague and indefinite as to offend due process,
but that they had "an accepted, definite, and clear meaning." 40 The
board had given as one of its reasons for disapproving the picture the
fact that it was "obscene." Since this word was thought certainly
definite, the court stated that it was not necessary to define the other
words contained in the censorship statute. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the judgment was reversed, per curiam, citing the Burstyn and
Superior Films cases.41
It would seem that the decision in the Holmby case was not com-
pletely based on the objection of excessive prior restraint, since there
is voluminous authority that obscenity is unprotected by the doctrine.
As was pointed out above, the Near case explicitly excluded ob-
scenity from the operation of the rule.42 In Lovell v. Griffin,43 the
Court was careful to point out, while it invalidated a standardless
ordinance requiring a license for the distribution of literature, that the
ordinance was not limited to literature that was obscene or offensive
to public morals or that advocated unlawful conduct. Similarly, in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 44 it was recognized in passing that
35But see concurring opinion by Justice Douglas, to which Justice Black
agreed, insisting that censorship could not be sanctioned under any circum-
stances. Ibid. The Court also failed to cite the Winters case in this decision.
36 The Attorney General of Ohio seemed to concede this point when he
argued before the Supreme Court that the term "harmful" had been limited
by the state court to mean "inciting to crime." See text at note 31 supra.
37 Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 305 N.Y. 336, 344, 352,
113 N.E.2d 502, 506, 510 (1953), rev'd per curiam sub nom., Superior Films,
Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
38 177 Kan. 728, 282 P.2d 412, rev'd per curiain, 350 U.S. 870 (1955).3 9 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-103 (1949). The statute provided for the
approval of films that are "moral and proper" and the disapproval of pictures
that are "cruel, obscene, indecent or immoral, or such as tend to debase or
corrupt morals."
4oHolmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 177 Kan. 728, 282 P2d 412, 414,
rev'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 870 (1955).
41 Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870 (1955).
42 See text at note 15 supra.
43303 U.S. 444 (1938).
44315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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the prevention of lewd and obscene speech has "never been thought
to raise any Constitutional problem." 45 On the other hand, it seems
almost as incredible that the Supreme Court would rule a "good old
common law word" 46 like "obscene" unconstitutional on the ground
of vagueness. The definition of obscene which is almost traditional
is "that which is offensive to chastity and modesty .. that form of
indecency which is calculated to promote the general corruption of
morals." 47 The test of obscenity is whether an utterance ". . . has
a tendency to deprave or corrupt the morals of those whose minds are
open to such influences and into whose hands it may fall by allowing
or implanting in such minds obscene, lewd, or lascivious thoughts or
desires." 48  The federal courts, in cases arising under a tariff act,49
have assumed that obscene is a sufficiently definite standard.50 In
addition, in cases involving statutes prohibiting the mailing of obscene
materials,51 courts have specifically held that obscene is sufficiently
definite.52 Even if such terms as "immoral" and "injurious to public
morals" are too indefinite, which is by no means conceded,53 the
Supreme Court certainly went beyond the necessary bounds if it meant
to hold "obscene" too indefinite.
Action and Reaction
As witnessed by the aforementioned string of reversals since the
Burstyn decision, many state courts have refused to follow the mood
of the Supreme. Court.54  Several states, however, have succumbed
45Id. at 571-72.
46 Desmond, Censoring the Movies, 29 NoTRE DAME LAW. 27, 31 (1953).
47 Burstein v. United States, 178 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1950). The defi-
nition has been narrowed to sexually impure language or conduct. Swearingen
v. United States, 161 U.S. 446 (1895).
4§ Burstein v. United States, supra note 47.
49 "All persons are prohibited from importing into the United States from
any foreign country . .. any obscene book, pamphlet, paper, writing, adver-
tisement, circular, print, picture, drawing or other representation, figure or
image on or of paper or other material. " 46 STAT. 688 (1930), 19 U.S.C.§ 1305(a) (1952).
50 United States v; Two Obscene Books, 97 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. 1951), aff'd
sub norn., Resig v. United States, 208 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1953).
51 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1952).
52 Tyomies Publishing Co. v. United States, 211 Fed. 385 (6th Cir. 1914);
Rebhuhn v. Cahill, 31 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). Cf. Glanzman v. Schaeffer,
143 F. Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1956),
53 The Supreme Court has sustained several convictions for the importation
or transportation in interstate commerce of women "for immoral purposes."
See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); United States v. Bitty,
208 U.S. 393 (1908). In Musser v. Vtah, 333 U.S. 95 (1942), the defendants
were convicted of conspiring to commit acts "injurious to ... public morals."
Id. at 96-97.
54 See note 25 supra. See also American Civil Liberties Union v. Chicago,
3 Ill. 2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 979 (1955), where
the same picture involved in the Burstyn case was successfully censored on the
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to the increased pressure brought to bear by the unswerving consis-
tency of the Court. In Ohio, the censorship board attempted to con-
tinue its work after the Supreme Court reversed the.board's ban on
the motion picture "M." 55 In R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc. v. De-
partment of Education, the Ohio Supreme Court construed the
Superior Films decision as an invalidation of the entire Ohio statute
and held that no censorship could be sustained under the act.5 6
In Pennsylvania, the board of censors banned a picture dealing
with narcotics called "She Should'a Said No !" on the ground that
it was "indecent and immoral." The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held in Hallmark Productions v. Carroll 57 that ". . . these terms
must be held subject to the same fatal objections as those which in-
validated the statutes held unconstitutional by that [Supreme]
Court." 58
In Kansas, prior to the Holmby case, the highest court upheld
the state censorship statute and the board, which had withheld a
license from the film "The Moon is Blue." " In an unusual move,
the legislature passed a statute repealing the censorship law.6 The
act, however, was subsequently declared unconstitutional for pro-
cedural reasons, thereby reviving the old lawY1
In the Massachusetts case of Brattle Films, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner,62 the court held unconstitutional a three hundred year old
"blue law" 63 which though it did not expressly authorize the censor-
ground that it was obscene. It would seem, however, that the Hohnby case
overruled this decision.
55 Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954). The
Ohio statute permitted the board to license "only such films as are, in thejudgment and discretion of the Department of Education, of a moral, educa-
tional, or amusing and harmless character... ." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3305.04(Baldwin 1953).
56 162 Ohio St. 263, 122 N.E2d 769 (1954). In a forceful dissent, however,
Justice Weygandt declared, "the basic difference of opinion among the mem-
hers of this court is whether the federal Supreme Court has in fact held the
Ohio statutes unconstitutional. The conclusion of the majority seems to be
that this has been done inferentially. It is the view of the minority that if,
at a time when delinquency-both juvenile and adult-is a problem of un-
precedented concern, the federal Supreme Court intends to hold that every film
no matter how obscene, profane, inflammatory or subversive can be shown, this
is too serious a matter to be left to mere inference alone." Id. at 269, 122
N.E.2d at 772.
57 384 Pa. 348, 121 A.2d 584 (1956).
58 Hallmark Productions Inc. v. Carroll, 384 Pa. 348, 121 A.2d 584, 589(1956). But see also vigorous and fiery dissent by Justice Musmanno. Id., 121
A.2d at 590.
59 See Bilgrey and Levenson, Censorship of Motion Pictures-Recent Judi-
cial Decisions and Legislative Action, 1 N.Y.L. FoRum 347, 349-50 (1955).6 0 Kan. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 349, § 1, repealing KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 51-101-51-112 (1949).61 See State ex rel. Fatzer v. Shanahan, 178 Kan. 400, 286 P.2d 742 (1955).
62 127 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1955).
63 MAss. ANN. LAWS C. 136, § 4 (1949).
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ship of films, did authorize such action by implication. Under its
terms, the mayor could grant a license for entertainment on Sunday,
but the approval of the entertainment by the Commissioner of Public
Safety was required. 64 The court considered the act in question void
on its face as a prior restraint on the freedom of speech and press
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments.
Several states, however, have taken steps to comply with the
somewhat obscure standard marked by the Supreme Court decisions.
The New York legislature amended the statute 65 held too indefinite
in the Burstyn and Commercial Films cases by defining the terms
"immoral" and "incite to crime." 66 In the face of a series of Balti-
more City Court decisions which reversed the Maryland censors, and
on the advice of the Attorney General, Maryland also revised its
statute.67 In addition, in Pennsylvania, after the Hallmark Produc-
tions case and in Massachusetts after the Brattle Films case move-
ments toward the enactment of new and more definite statutes were
instituted.6 8
Conflict of Views
The vast majority of writers since the Burstyn decision claim
that censorship is unnecessary; and, for the most part, an unconsti-
tutional prior restraint.69 The uncompromising attitude taken by the
Supreme Court in holding statutes using such previously acceptable
standards as "immoral" and "obscene" unconstitutional, lends consid-
erable support to this latter view. It has been said that the censorship
64 ". .. [T]he mayor of a city... may, upon written application ... grant
upon such terms and conditions as . . .he may prescribe, a license to hold on
the Lord's Day a public entertainment . . .approved in writing by the com-
missioner of public safety... ." MAss. ANN. LAws c. 136, § 4 (1949).
65 N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 122.
66 The amendment section 122-a reads as follows: "1. For the purpose of
section one hundred twenty-two of this chapter, the term 'immoral' and the
phrase 'of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals'
shall denote a motion picture film or part thereof, the dominant purpose or
effect of which is erotic or pornographic; or which portrays acts of sexual
immorality, perversion, or lewdness, or which expressly or impliedly presents
such acts as desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of behavior.
2. For the purpose of section one hundred twenty-two of this chapter, the
term 'incite to crime' shall denote a motion picture the dominant purpose or
effect of which is to suggest that the commission of criminal acts or contempt
for law is profitable, desirable, acceptable, or respectable behavior; or which
advocates or teaches the use of, or the methods of use of, narcotics or habit-
forming drugs." Id. § 122-a (Supp. 1956).
67 See Bilgrey and Levenson, Censorship of Motion Pictures-Recent Judi-
cial Decisions and Legislative Action, 1 N.Y.L. FoRum 347, 349-51 (1955).
68 See note 67 supra.
69 See, e.g., Brychta, The Ohio Film Censorship Law, 13 OHIO ST. L.J. 350,
374-75 (1952) ; Notes, 30 IND. L.J. 462, 473-74 (1955), 31 N. DAMx. L. REV. 62,
67 (1955), 34 OmE. L. Rzv. 250, 256 (1955).
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of the Breen Office, self imposed by the American movie industry,70
public opinion mobilized by the numerous pressure groups,71 and the
subsequent-restraints of the federal and state obscenity statutes 72 wield
great force as a deterrent to abuse. It is clear, however, that self-
regulation and pressure groups are not sufficient protection against
foreign and domestic independent, fly-by-night producers who are not
bound by the Breen Office, and irresponsible Hollywood producers
who ignore it and thrive on the furor and notoriety thereby created.73
It is apparent also that after-the-fact prosecutions under the state and
federal statutes, in most cases, fall short of being effective.74 Further-
more, if, as it seems, the terms "immoral" and "obscene" were ruled
too indefinite as a basis for prior restraint, the same objection might
hold against their use in these statutes. It should be observed that
there are two types of detrimental movies, and the after-the-fact ob-
scenity statute would be effective against only one. That type is the
film which is obscene per se or stimulates inclinations to commit a
specific unlawful act. The second category includes the film that
does not immediately give rise to a particular frame of mind, though
it helps bring about a gradual changeof attitude, clouding the viewer's
sense of right and wrong. For instance, the subtle portrayal of loose
or adulterous conduct may fall short of instantaneous stimulation, but
could give the viewer the impression that such conduct is acceptable.
It has been pointed out that motion pictures play an important part
in shaping conducf and secure a higher degree of attention and re-
tention than any other medium. 75 When it is remembered that a
huge percentage of our national movie audience consists of especially
impressionable children these arguments take on increased meaning.76
Admittedly, there have been abuses by scrupulous, prejudiced and
tyrannical censors.77 The imperfections, however, have been more
than counterbalanced by the important job performed. Movies are
peculiarly adapted to censorship 78 and history has taught that this is
a fortunate and useful feature.
70 See Note, 31 N. DAK. L. REv. 62, 66 (1955).
7' See Comment, 42 CALIF. L. Rzv. 122, 124 n.17 (1954); Note, 60 YALE
L.J. 696, 713-14 (1951).
72 See Note, 30 IND. L.J. 462, 475 (1955).
73 See Note, 30 IND. LJ. 462, 464-65 (1955).
74 See Note, 49 Nw. L. Rzv. 390, 397 (1954). The federal statutes have
seldom been enforced, and have also been held not to supersede the police power
of the state in the same area. Note, 30 IND. L. REv. 462, 465 (1955).
7 See Notes, 30 IND. L.J. 462, 466 (1955), 60 YALE L.J. 696, 707 n28
(1951).
76 See Notes, 30 IND. L.J. 462, 465-66 (1955), 60 YALE L.J. 696, 710 n.31
(1951).
77 See Kupferman and O'Brien, Motion Picture Censorship-The Memphis
Blites, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 273 (1951) ; Note, 60 YALE L.J. 696, 698 n.6 , 699 nn.7
& 8, 700 n.9 (1951).
78 See Desmond, Censoring the Movies, 29 NoTRE DAME LAW. 27, 31 (1953).
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NOTES
Concluson
Despite some authority to the contrary, it would seeni that limited
censorship is still constitutional in the view of the Supreme Court.
The Court has historically adverted to the existence of morality,79 and
a traditional theory of harmony between the law and public morals.8 0
It is true that the recent decisions of the Supreme Court have sharply
limited the scope of the power, and the Holinby Productions case in
particular dealt a near death blow to censorship as known prior to
the Burstyn decision. It is apparent, however, that-a narrow though
indefinite area is still open to prior restraint in this field. The Court
indicated in the Burstyn case that censorship is not unconstitutional
per se 8 1 and the arguments before the Court in the Superior Filns
decision show that the Court had not changed its opinion at that date. 2
In view of the present status of censorship, therefore, it is con-
tended that the decisions of the Pennsylvania and Ohio courts holding
their statutes invalid were unfortunate. Even if these statutes came
within the prohibitions of the Supreme Court decisions, which is at
least debatable,m the alternative still remained to limit the indefinite
terms by judicial construction . 4 In the alternative it is recommended
that the legislatures of states whose statutes come within the consti-
tutional ban, follow the lead taken by New York, in passing definitive
amendments. 5
79 See Whelan, Censorship and the Constitutional Concept of Morality,
43 GEo. L.J. 547 (1955). "What is immoral within the meaning of this concept
may be prohibited precisely because it is immoral; indeed-what is more-the
stimuli and occasions of public immorality may be stifled and suppressed."
Id. at 549.
80 See Whelan, supra note 79, at 549 n.7. "No legislature can bargain away
... the public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less their
servants." Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819 (1879). See Douglas v.
Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488, 505 (1897) (lottery); Crowley v. Christensen, 137
U.S. 86, 90-91 (1890) (liquor); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 662 (1887)
(liquor).
81 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). "It does not follow
that the Constitution requires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture
of every kind at all times and all places." Id. at 502.
8222 U.S.L. WEEK 3181 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1954) (No. 26).
83See R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 162 Ohio St.
263, 122 N.E.2d 769, 772 (1954) (dissenting opinion); Hallmark Productions,
Inc. v. Carroll, 384 Pa. 348, 121 A.Zd 584, 590 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
84 Where vagueness of a statute is cured by an opinion of the state court
or removed by legislation, the Supreme Court will not interfere. Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510, 514, 519 (1948) ; Note, 62 HARv. L. RFv. 77, 82
(1948).
85 N.Y. Enuc. LAw § 122-a (Supp. 1956).
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